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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Presentation of the subject 
 
The intent of this thesis is to compare and elaborate general characteristics of the petrole-
um regimes in Norway and in the U.S.A. Especially, the duties of care owed by the opera-
tor to non-operators under the mandatory Norwegian operating agreement for the 22
nd
 
license-round and the 2007 AAPL 810 offshore model-form JOA for the Gulf of Mexico.  
 
1.2 An introduction to the operating agreement  
 
The Joint Operating Agreement, hereinafter the JOA, is the legal framework between oil 
and gas companies that engage in joint upstream petroleum production. The basis for enti-
tlements to petroleum is an interest carved out of a concession described as a production 
license
1
 in Norway, or a lease in the U.S.A. 
Where joint operations are projected as a result of a production license or lease, several 
matters have to be specified such as development of the contract area, method of recovery, 
operation of the well, control procedures, payment of expenses, and division of petroleum. 
The JOA serves this function, and sets forth each party’s fractional interest in the contract 
area which will serve as basis for each party’s share of petroleum and related costs.  
  
One of the parties
2
 will be named operator. The operator’s duty of care and liability to the 
non-operators under the Norwegian operating agreement
3
 and the AAPL JOA
4
 is the topic 
                                                 
 
1
 Section 3-3 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities. 
2
 It is not a requirement that the operator is a party to the operating agreement 
3
 The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy’s mandatory operating agreement (2007) for participants on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf 
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of this thesis. 
  
Before I discuss that subject matter, some knowledge of the petroleum regime in each ju-
risdiction is necessary to comprehend the agreements. For that reason, I will first explain 
and compare some general legal characteristics of the Norwegian- and U.S. based petrole-
um activities (Part 2), before I compare the duty of care (Part 3) 
 
1.3 Limit of topic 
 
I will not raise questions of the validity of various provisions in the operating agreements, 
nor will I compare the opportunity for courts to change the terms and the applicable reme-
dies for breach. 
 
2 THE PETROLEUM-REGIME IN NORWAY AND IN THE U.S.A. 
2.1 The exclusive right to petroleum deposits 
 
Section 1-1 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
(Hereinafter the petroleum act) gives the Norwegian state a proprietary right to subsea pe-
troleum deposits and the exclusive right to resource management
5
.  
The area subject to the exclusive right is specified in section 1-4 which is telling that the 
petroleum act governs subsea petroleum activities in areas subject to Norwegian jurisdic-
tion and on the continental shelf according to international law or treaties. The United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Seas
6
 represents established international law and the 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
4
 American Association of Professional Landsmen’s 810 JOA (2007) for offshore operations in  the Gulf of 
Mexico 
5
 The proprietary right applies to mineral resource management on the Norwegian territory including the 
Exclusive Economic Zone - 200 miles/370km from the seaboard of Norway 
6
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas signed December 10th 1982 
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convention is signed by Norway. Article 55-73 in the convention allows the State to exer-
cise sovereign rights seaward 200 nautical miles/370km from the baseline. Further, article 
76(1) and 77 lets the State explore and exploit natural resources in areas where the conti-
nental shelf exceeds 200 nautical miles seaward. 
The Norwegian State signed treaties with The United Kingdom and Denmark during the 
1960s settling areas with sovereign rights, leaving only ocean boundaries to Russia in the 
Barents Sea unsettled. However, The Norwegian State compromised with Russia and 
signed a bilateral treaty in 2011, thus settling the last dispute regarding ocean boundaries 
from the mainland of Norway. 
 
The exclusive sovereign right effectively lets the Norwegian State decide whether to pro-
duce the subsea deposits itself or allow companies to produce them. Hence, the state can set 
whatever terms it deems necessary and dictate requirements for companies aspiring to op-
erate on sovereign ground. One of the privileges of the exclusive right amounts to choose 
how the State shall reserve its take
7
  of produced petroleum either by producing it on their 
own, sharing production as a working-interest or carried interest in a group of oil compa-
nies, or allowing a private company produce it all. A combination of these methods are 
chosen with a regime of regulations allowing the state to decide which companies that shall 
cooperate, who shall be appointed operator, the length of exploration and production, and 
several other terms. However, the State must exercise these rights within the limitations of 
EEA-agreement. Among the limitations is a duty to make sure that the parties to the EEA-
agreement compete on equal terms, with no discrimination based on nationality
8
. An addi-
tional right that follows from the exclusive sovereign right is the authority to impose taxes, 
like the petroleum tax 
 
                                                 
 
7
 In the oil and gas industry, the government’s take is the State’s right to a share of the petroleum. Either 
monetary or in kind. The State’s Direct Financial Interest (SDFI)portfolio is managed by Petoro. 
8
 Lov av 27.11.1992 nr. 109 om gjennomføring i norsk rett av hoveddelen i avtale om Det europeiske 
økonomiske samarbeidsområde (EØS) m.v. (EØS-loven). artikkel 4: Enhver forskjellsbehandling på grunnlag 
av nasjonalitet skal være forbudt innenfor denne avtales virkeområde, med forbehold for de 
særbestemmelser den selv gir. 
 4 
In the U.S.A., entitlement to the underground or subsea petroleum will depend on the own-
ership of the land. 
If the land is private
9
, the owner has an exclusive right to all petroleum produced from the 
land.  
For non-private public land, the situation is different. Petroleum from public land is under 
the exclusive right of the Federal State, the State or the Indian Tribe if the tract is at an In-
dian reservation (Tribes are “domestic, dependent nations”10 possessing certain inherent 
sovereign powers)
11
.  
Public land is divided in state onshore lands, state aquatic and offshore lands, Indian 
lands, federal onshore lands and federal offshore lands
12
. 
State aquatic and offshore lands stretch out seaward 3 nautical miles/5.6km
13
. Federal Off-
shore Lands represent the remaining seaward area 197 nautical miles/364km
14
 out in the 
seabed
15
. Federal royalties on minerals represented about 33% of revenue for the U.S. 
Treasury in 2006. In comparison, the petroleum activities contributed roughly 26% of the 
Norwegian government’s total revenues..  
 
2.2 Entitlement to petroleum in Norway compared to entitlement to 
petroleum on different lands in the U.S.A. 
 
As mentioned, the Norwegian government has an exclusive right to all offshore petroleum 
deposits within the Exclusive Economic Zone or excess areas on the contiguous continental 
shelf. The ownership of petroleum in the U.S. requires a bit more explanation. I will in the 
                                                 
 
9
 Applies to onshore tracts 
10
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) 
11
 John S. Lowe, Owen L. Anderson, Ernest E. Smith, David E. Pierce, Cases and Materials in Oil and Gas law, 
Fifth Edition, Thompson West pg. 911 
12
John S. Lowe, Owen L. Anderson, Ernest E. Smith, David E. Pierce, Cases and Materials in Oil and Gas law, 
Fifth Edition, Thompson West pg. 834, 835 
13
 Ceded to the states by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 43 U.S.C. §§1301-1315 
14
 NOAA, Office of Coast Survey, http://www.nauticalcharts.noaa.gov/csdl/mbound.htm 
15
 The Exclusive Economic Zone 
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following paragraphs compare ownership to onshore oil and gas on private land to owner-
ship of oil and gas from federal lands.  Ownership of oil and gas on U.S. federal land is 
subject to the same form of ownership as oil and gas on the N.C.S.. 
 
2.2.1 Ownership of petroleum produced from U.S. onshore private lands 
 
The private property owner in the U.S.A. is entitled to petroleum resources on the surface 
of his property, under the surface of his property. These are resources that can be severed 
from the rest of the property in leases, and then leased to companies (titled Lessees) want-
ing to develop and produce them with royalty as consideration to the property-owner. Ad-
ditionally, the property-owner is entitled to whatever resources he can access from the sur-
face of his property according to the rule-of-capture doctrine which applies in most 
states
16
. The private ownership to onshore underground petroleum as fee simple/fee-simple-
absolutes
17
 has a no equivalent in Norway. The Norwegian Mineral Act
18
 article 7 exempts 
petroleum, and the act  regarding onshore exploration for and production of petroleum
19
 
gives the Norwegian State an exclusive right to all petroleum resources
20
.  
 
2.2.2 Ownership to petroleum produced from U.S. offshore federal lands 
 
Leases to offshore tracts are treated very differently than onshore private leases. The Out 
Continental Shelf Lands Act authorizes the federal Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
                                                 
 
16
 States that have adopted the ownership-in-place doctrine and states that have adopted the exclusive-
right-to-take doctrine. Though, limited by the rule of trespass    
17
 States with the ownership-in-place doctrine. Most U.S. states 
18
 Lov av 19.juni 2009 nr.101 om erverv og utvinning av mineralressurse (MIneralloven)  
19
 Lov av 5.april 1973 nr.21 om undersøkelser etter og utvinning av petroleum i grunnen under norsk 
landområde 
20
 Lov av 5.april 1973 nr.21 om undersøkelser etter og utvinning av petroleum i grunnen under norsk 
landområde artikkel 1 
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(Hereinafter the BOEM) to sell off leases to offshore tracts in bid rounds
21
. These are sold 
as a temporary
22
 leasehold interest, not fee simples/fee-simple-absolutes or similar instru-
ments.  If the highest bidder meets certain criteria, he will be entitled to produce the petro-
leum as a lessee with the federal state being the lessor.  This way of allocating offshore 
tracts has several similarities with the concessionary system in Norway, because the Feder-
al State has the proprietary right to exclusive management of the tracts before and after 
they are conveyed in leases comparable to the production licenses
23
 in Norway.  
 
2.3 General about the concessionary regime vs. the lease-based regime 
 
The concessionary regime of Norway awards companies a right to explore and produce 
petroleum based on licenses. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is in charge of the ad-
ministration of these licenses
24
.There are chiefly two licenses necessary in upstream opera-
tions. The first license is the non-exclusive Exploration license
25
 which allows companies 
to explore for petroleum by means of seismic surveys, etc., in a pre-determined area, but 
not produce petroleum. The other license is the Production License
26
 which awards compa-
nies the sole right to explore, drill and produce petroleum from blocks
27
 covered by the 
license.  
The production licenses are publicly announced licensing rounds where companies submit 
application for the license. The applications are then considered by the Ministry of Petrole-
um and Energy. After evaluating the applications, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
will cooperate with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and form groups of companies 
                                                 
 
21
 The last bid round was held in the Superdome in New Orleans March 20
th
 2013 where drilling tracts that 
could give production of up to 890 million barrels of oil and 3.9 trillion cubic feet of gas were sold off. 
Source: http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2013/03/oil_leases_up_for_bid_in_centr.html 
22
 5-10 years or so long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities. 
23
 See 2.3.2 
24
 Section 1-4 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
25
 Chapter 2 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
26
 Chapter 3 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
27
 Section 3-2 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities. 
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that are awarded
28
 production licenses. They will also appoint the operator
29
 in each group. 
 
Leases to private onshore land in the U.S.A are conveyed as any other private property on 
the free market without mentionable interference from the government. Thus, anybody with 
money, willing to engage in the onshore oil and gas production can acquire leases without 
having to be approved by a government agency. Though, drilling requires a permit to drill, 
which may call for some pre-determinations and environmental impact studies. 
 
Leases to federal offshore tracts are subject to a different legal regime. Offshore-leases are 
conveyed by the BOEM
30
 to oil and gas companies in sealed-bid
31
 auctions. Bidders place 
their bids based on seismic data
32
 and estimates of possible yield and costs of the block. 
The lease grants companies as lessees the exclusive right to explore, develop, and produce 
oil and gas subject to non-negotiable terms and covenants set forth in, among other acts, the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (Hereinafter the OCSLA)
33
. The act is adminis-
tered by the BOEM (pre 2010: Minerals Management Service) which administers the leas-
es, and controls offshore operations that affect the Federal States’ coastal zones34. 
Under the O.C.S.LA, there are four steps in the development of an offshore oil well on fed-
eral offshore lands: (1) development of a five-year leasing plan by the Dept. of Interior and 
BOEM; (2) offering, sale, and issuance of leases by the BOEM; (3) exploration operations 
by the lessee; (4) drilling, development, and production operations by the lessee
35
. Each 
                                                 
 
28
 The license is awarded in a council comprised of the ministers and the prime minister. 
29
 Section 3-7(1) in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
30
 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
31
 Federal offshore leases are awarded in sealed-bid rounds. Onshore federal leases in oral bid rounds. 
Source: Professor (J.D) Owen L. Anderson, Eugene Kuntz Chair of Law in Oil, Gas and Natural Resources, 
the University of Oklahoma College of Law 
32
 Hendricks, K., R. Porter, and G. Tan, Bidding Ring and Winner’s Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and 
Gas Lease Auctions,  NBER working paper 9836 
33
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 U.S.C. 43 
34
 John S. Lowe, Owen L. Anderson, Ernest E. Smith, David E. Pierce, Cases and Materials in Oil and Gas law, 
Fifth Edition, Thompson West pg. 868 
35
 John S. Lowe, Owen L. Anderson, Ernest E. Smith, David E. Pierce, Cases and Materials in Oil and Gas law, 
Fifth Edition, Thompson West pg. 868 
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step has environmental analysis components
36
. 
 
Comparing the two petroleum regimes, it is quite apparent that the offshore activities in 
Norway and the U.S.A. are subject to comparable regulatory regime that is not under the 
influence of the participant.  
 
For example, both require environmental impact reports open for public comment referred 
to as Environment Impact Study in the O.C.S.LA and referred to as Impact Assessment re-
lating to opening of new areas for petroleum activities in the Norwegian Regulations chap-
ter 2a.  
 
Both the regimes convey a sole right to explore for and produce petroleum
37
, but not actu-
ally undertake operations without additional permits which are obtained after filing Plan 
for Development and Operation of Petroleum Deposits
38
 (Norway) and Development and 
Production Plan
39
 (U.S.A.). 
 
Both regimes require upfront cash payment referred to as Bid for lease in the O.C.S.LA and 
referred to as Handling Fee (Currently NOK 109 000/approximately $20 000) in the Nor-
wegian Regulations.  
A fundamental difference is that the bid for lease serves as qualification to obtain the lease 
in the U.S.A., whereas, the handling fee is a small fixed fee companies must pay to be con-
sidered in the licensing round. In the end, the qualification for being awarded a production 
license is not based on who pays most, but rather which company the Ministry of Petrole-
um and Energy finds that presents the best plan for development and operation
40
, possess 
                                                 
 
36
 John S. Lowe, Owen L. Anderson, Ernest E. Smith, David E. Pierce, Cases and Materials in Oil and Gas law, 
Fifth Edition, Thompson West pg 868 
37
 The production license (The exploration license is not a sole-right) and the lease 
38
 Section 4-2 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities. 
39
 O.C.S.L.A § 1351 (a)(1) 
40
 Section 10(b) in the regulations to act relating to petroleum activities of June 27
th
 1997 
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the best skills, experience, financial capacity and similar
41
.  
The difference in upfront payment can partly be explained by comparing the manner in 
which the government collects its exclusive take.  
Under the OCSLA, each participant pays a significant amount of money upfront when bid-
ding for the lease
42
 and pays ordinarily 28% net income tax
43
 plus 37-41%
44
 royalty to the 
federal government. 
In Norway, the awardee pays the handling fee, but nothing for the rights conveyed in the 
production license. The ordinary 28% net profit income tax is though complemented by a 
special 50% petroleum tax
45
 (Uplift and unused uplift is not subject the special tax). In 
sum, the tax on profits from petroleum production is about 78 percent in Norway (Not 
counting handling fee, area fee
46
, production fee
47
, cash bonus
48
, possible fees for regulato-
ry supervision
49
, indirect costs of carrying Petoro). However, the awardees can deduct 
costs, such as depreciation, financial costs, operations costs, losses and losses carried for-
ward, and also decommissioning costs once they are incurred. 
 
Comparing the regimes, it is quite obvious that engaging in offshore petroleum activities on 
the O.C.S. requires more start-up capital, largely because a significant part of the govern-
ment’s take is intended to be paid through the bid before any production has commenced. It 
is a viable contention that the financial burden of engaging in offshore activities in the 
                                                 
 
41
 Section 10(a) in the regulations to act relating to petroleum activities of June 27
th
 1997 
42
 The average winning bid for a lease on the O.C.S. was $3 750 000 in the last lease-autcion.  
In the March 2013 auction for offshore leases on the O.C.S. the sum of all winning lease bids reached $1.2 
billion. 52 oil and gas companies participated in bidding for 320 blocks.  
Norwegian Statoil and Samsung Offshore jointly bid $81.8 million to win the second most expensive single 
lease on it’s top priority lease, known as “Walker Ridge 271”. Statoil won 15 leases in the bid round.  
Source: http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/Gulf-of-Mexico-
Region/Gulf-of-Mexico-Top-Ten-Highest-Number-of-Bids-on-a-Single-Block-for-All-Sales.aspx 
43
 Varies 
44
 2006 Average royalties from the U.S. O.C.S. (Deepwater leases). Source: U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07676r.pdf 
45
 The Petroleum Tax Act of June 13
th
 1975 no 35 Section 5 
46
 section 4-10 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities. 
47
 section 4-10 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities. 
48
 section 4-10 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities. 
49
 section 10-3 in the regulations to act relating to petroleum activities of June 27
th
 1997 
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U.S.A. is higher
50
 than in Norway where the upfront payments are lower. The opportunity 
to deduct costs in the startup period underpins that statement.  
 
There is also a difference when it comes to government taxation and fees. In Norway, sev-
eral fees and taxes have to be paid by the awardees of production licenses, among them the 
production fee, area fee and a special 50% petroleum tax (And even as dividend, the gov-
ernment take
51
,  from Petoro), whereas the U.S. Federal government claims royalty as a 
private landowner on the O.C.S., plus ordinary profit tax on profits. 
 
Both regulatory regimes require the bidder to be qualified and to show proof of financial 
ability to perform operations
52
. The Petroleum Act and O.C.S.LA impose a minimum work 
commitment
53
  
Further, both regimes requires the participants to put up with whatever new legislation that 
might affect the activities at any time.  
Both regimes allow a government agency to prescribe value of production for royalty 
(tax
54
) purposes in the U.S.A, referred to as norm price
55
 in Norway.   
 
Fact is that fundamental deviations of the two regulatory regimes for offshore activities are 
rare. 
 
Though, some fundamental differences can be found. One of them is that there is no statu-
tory right
56
 in the U.S.A. for a host government owned company like Petoro to share in a 
                                                 
 
50
 For blocks with high certainty of yield 
51
 See footnote 6 
52
 O.C.S.LA 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1), section 10 in the regulations to act relating to petroleum activities of June 
27
th
 1997 
53
 O.C.S.LA 43 U.S.C.  § 1337(b)(2), section 3-8, 3-9 10 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to 
Petroleum Activities 
54
 In Norway 
55
 section 33 in the regulations to act relating to petroleum activities of June 27
th
 1997 
56
 Chapter 11 in the 10 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
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block as a working interest or a carried interest
57
. 
The duration of the leases is also aberrant. The U.S. offshore-lease has two terms. The pri-
mary term is 5-7 years, and a second term for so long as oil and gas is produced in paying 
quantities or approved drilling or well reworking operations are being conducted
58
,
59
.The 
Norwegian production license grants exclusive rights for 10 years, but can be prolonged 
upon application. Comparing the duration of the offshore-lease and production license, it is 
quite clear the offshore-lease has a more predictive duration within the control of the les-
sees, than the production license.  
For the theses, however, the most fundamental dissimilarity is that there is not a provision 
in the O.C.S.L.A. or elsewhere in U.S. legislation requiring a group of lessees to enter in a 
specific non-negotiable JOA
60
. Hence, it is a viable claim the Norwegian State intervenes 
more horizontally in the relationship between awardees of production licenses, whereas the 
U.S. government takes a more vertical approach. 
 
2.3.1 Financial risk of the lease vs. the production license 
 
One might ask whether the bidder for a lease incurs more financial risk than the applicant 
for a production license because of the way rights are conveyed in each regime.  
One factor is the considerable upfront payment for the lease, which at first glance could 
support a finding that a participant in the lease-auction incurs more risk in case the block is 
dry.  
However, that contention is partly offset as the price of the lease will reflect the risk. I.e., it 
is more likely that an expensive lease will yield in commercial quantities. 
                                                 
 
57
 It is worth noticing that Petoro frequently claims a smaller share or waives the right to participate 
58
 O.C.S.LA 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) 
59
 Paying quantities means production of quantities of oil or gas sufficient to yield a daily profit to the lessee 
over daily operating expenses, even though the drilling costs, or equipping costs, are never recovered, and 
even though the undertaking as a whole may result in a loss to the lessee. Source: Reese Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Lawson, 220 Kan. 300, 553 P.2d 885 (1976). 
60
 Section 3-3 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
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Nevertheless, investors can hardly ever be fully sure of the stratigraphy of a subsea block, 
thus an upfront bid in the $90
61
 million range will require a cool head.  
The same appetite for immediate financial risk is not necessary on the N.C.S.. After paying 
the relative low handling fee, grantees of the production license can drill test wells and 
study well samples before decide to incur massive costs for permanent installations. 
It is therefore a viable claim that bidding for the expensive blocks in the lease auction re-
quires a bit more risk-willingness than what is necessary when applying for the production 
license. 
 
2.3.2 More specific about the terms of the production license and the lease 
 
The terms of leases to onshore private lands in the U.S. are decided by the lessor and les-
see, and certain implied covenants. Though, terms of regulatory- and conservation laws 
will apply.  
  
The terms of the production license are decided by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
62
 
which sets forth the rights and duties that the companies owe to the State. The production 
license will then complement the Petroleum Act and other regulations with specific terms.  
Comparably, The BOEM decides the terms of the Federal lease within the limitation of 
U.S. Federal law. 
 
Companies applying for a production license must fulfill certain requirements that are 
found in section 3-3 of the Petroleum Act to. The fifth paragraph of Section 3-3 states that 
the King may stipulate as a condition for granting a production license that the licensees 
                                                 
 
61
 The highest bid in the 2013 lease-auction was $ 93 million. Source: http://www.boem.gov/Oil-and-Gas-
Energy-Program/Leasing/Regional-Leasing/Gulf-of-Mexico-Region/Gulf-of-Mexico-Top-Ten-Highest-
Number-of-Bids-on-a-Single-Block-for-All-Sales.aspx  
62
 Section 3-3 in the Act of November 29
th
 1996 No. 72 relating to Petroleum Activities 
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shall enter into agreements with specified contents with one another. Consequently, the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has drafted a standard agreement with non-negotiable 
terms which companies seeking a production license must enter into.  
 
2.4 The mandatory operating agreement for petroleum activities on the 
Norwegian continental shelf 
 
This standard agreement (Hereinafter the Norwegian operating agreement) sets forth rights 
and duties between companies that are awarded a production license in the same operating 
unit. 
The MPD JOA, along with the accounting procedures and special provisions, makes up 
what is called Agreement for petroleum activities.  
 
2.4.1 The collaborative nature of the Norwegian petroleum act, the production 
license and the agreement for petroleum activities 
 
The collaborative nature of the petroleum act, the production license and the agreement for 
petroleum activities can be regarded as an inter-related network of rules governing petrole-
um activities and offering the State a vast flexibility to control each operating unit in detail 
without participating itself. It is the mandatory model-form operating agreement that makes 
this relationship special compared to what is required in other industries. By requiring the 
party to enter into the non-negotiable operating agreement, the government effectively sets 
the terms of the horizontal relationship between the parties.  
Thus, depriving the parties of their freedom of contract and integrating the operating 
agreement to the States regulatory scheme. 
 
The integration of the agreement to the regulatory scheme can be seen in section 7 of the 
special provisions to the Agreement for petroleum activities. Section 7 sets forth a require-
ment for permission and approval from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy for any 
 14 
amendments to the agreement.  
The reality is, however, that the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy will in most cases not 
allow amendments
63
. The reason for such a strict interpretation of the language of section 7 
is the goal of a uniform JOA with undeviating terms
64
.  
The fact that entering into the Norwegian operating agreement is a term
65
 for obtaining a 
production license makes it obvious that the Norwegian operating agreement is not a fully 
commercial contract, but subject to the discretion of the government
66
. Hence, the agree-
ment can be regarded as a governed by the law of contracts and administrative law
67
.  
 
No such requirement is found in the U.S. petroleum regime. The legislature has stuck to the 
traditional vertical regulatory scheme, where the parties obtain the parties must obey statu-
tory requirements, but retains the freedom of contract in their internal affairs such as the 
JOA. 
 
However, for the sake of comparison: Even though there are no statutory provision requir-
ing participants in the U.S. oil and gas industry to enter into JOAs, nor any statutory provi-
sion enabling the government to set the terms of the JOA, there are oil and gas conversation 
laws that effectively can force a person with a leasehold-interest to enter into a JOA. For 
example, in Oklahoma, a person with a leasehold-interest can be forced-pooled into an op-
erating unit by the Oklahoma Corporate Commission. When being forced-pooled, the 
leasehold interest-owner can select to be a carried interest, or a working interest along with 
the other working interests in the unit. If choosing the latter, the owner of the leasehold-
interest will be forced to enter into a JOA or another similar agreement setting forth the 
rights and duties of the working interests-owners in the unit. The force-pooled party must 
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accept the terms set forth by the other parties, because denying the terms has no effect, he 
will still be forced-pooled allotting his share of the tract to operating unit, thus subject to 
the terms of the underlying agreement.  For that reason, the forced pooled lease-owner will 
ordinarily not have much opportunity to negotiate the terms of the JOA, which is somewhat 
comparable to the situation of parties to the Norwegian operating agreement. 
 
2.4.2  The background and development of the operating agreement 
 
The Joint Operating Agreement (hereinafter JOA) has been applied in petroleum activities 
in the U.S. ever since the first AAPL JOA was developed by the American Association of 
Professional Landmen (Former: American Association of Petroleum Landmen) in 1956 as 
the AAPL 610 with minor adjustments in 1977, 1982 and 1989. The last AAPL JOA is the 
2007 AAPL 810 Model Form JOA for offshore activities. The latter is for the most part 
similar to the 1989-form with some modifications deemed necessary for offshore activi-
ties
68
. 
The JOA was introduced in Norway with the first licensing rounds in 1965 and 1972
69
. The 
first agreements were at first fully commercial agreements negotiated on individual terms 
comparable to those found in the base AAPL JOA
70
. The strong influence of the U.S. 
AAPL-form is no surprise given that most of the oil and gas companies on the N.C.S. in the 
early days of wildcatting were U.S. oil and gas supermajors
71
. The concessionary system 
was effectuated in the third licensing round and the agreements from the first licensing 
rounds served as templates for the new mandatory agreement, thus giving the AAPL 
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69
 Anne-Karin Nesdam, Knut Kaasen, Jan B Jansen og Joachim M Bjerke, Articles in Petroleum Law, MarIus 
404 pg 13. 
70
 Nils Heilemann, Revisjon av samarbeidsavtalen og regnskapsavtalen, MarIus 340, pg 23. 
71
 The supermajors are the world’s biggest publicly traded oil and gas companies. Oklahoma-based Philips 
Petroleum (Operator on the platform Ocean Viking) drilled a well capable of producing in paying quantities 
on December 23.-24. 1969. The well became part of the Ekofisk Complex. New Jersey-based Esso (Operator 
on Ocean Traveler) drilled their first exploratory well on the N.C.S. in 1966.  
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agreements a profound foundation on the N.C.S..  
 
The mentioned circumstances are partly the reason why I found that a comparison of the 
Norwegian operating agreement and the AAPL JOA would be meaningful. The lack of 
Norwegian preliminary work associated with the original
72
 Norwegian operating agree-
ment, lack of court interpretations of the Norwegian operaing agreement (mostly due to the 
arbitration clause
73
), and the international aspect of the JOAs was also influencing the deci-
sion. An upside to the AAPL forms is that the agreements have not changed fundamentally 
over time
74
. Thus, with considerable oil and gas production in the U.S. since 1859, agree-
ments for petroleum production have repeatedly been exposed to close scrutiny by courts 
and legal scholars. Consequently, the legal materials associated with oil and gas law are 
vast and can potentially give rise to interesting comparisons.  
 
2.5 Interpretation of the agreements  
 
The governing principles and methods of interpretation will be determined by the clause 
setting forth the choice of law. Article 29 in the Norwegian operating agreement requires 
Norwegian Law to govern disputes arising in connection with the agreement. Thus, Nor-
wegian codes, principles and methods of law apply to the agreement.  
 
Article 26.4.1 of the AAPL JOA allows parties to choose default law for disputes arising 
from the agreement. I will in the following paragraph assume that the parties choose to 
have their agreement governed by law of a U.S. state. Thus, the principles of interpretation  
in U.S common-law tradition will apply. 
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As a starting point, commercial contracts are interpreted by construing the language objec-
tively both in Norwegian civil-law- and U.S. common-law tradition. However, the objective 
meaning will not be governing if there is a preponderance of evidence showing that the 
parties had a mutual way of interpreting the agreement that deviates from the objective 
meaning of the language
75
.    
 
2.5.1 Contract or administrative decision 
 
The circumstance that the Norwegian operating agreement is not negotiated on commercial 
terms, makes it somewhat distinct from the AAPL JOA. The distinction arises out of the 
fact that the Norwegian operating agreement is a government imposed term for being 
awarded a production license, complementing the production license, the petroleum act and 
regulations
76
. Some legal scholars have articulated that the Norwegian operating agreement 
has some similarities to administrative decisions
77
 which customarily are interpreted more 
objectively than fully commercial contracts where circumstances of a subjective character 
can be determining on the interpretation
78
. Accordingly, a determination of the relationship 
established in the agreements is required to determine relevant method of interpretation 
 
The lack of freedom of contract can lead to the conclusion that the JOA-relationship is not 
a contractual, but an administrative decision. The rationale behind such an argument is that 
the parties engage in the contract involuntarily as the contract is a non-negotiable condi-
tion
79
 for being awarded a production license, and because the terms of the agreement are 
not decided by the parties. 
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On the other hand, the parties voluntarily apply for the production license in the licensing 
round as a result of free enterprise and freedom of contract. In that process, the parties are 
fully aware of their obligation to accept to enter into the mandatory MPE. For that reason, I 
have few concerns deeming the relationship as contractual. Consequently, applicable 
methods of interpretation of contracts will apply to the Norwegian operating agreement.  
 
Whether or not the determination would have had a significant influence on the interpreta-
tion is less certain, because interpretations of government decisions and commercial 
agreement have proved to be remarkably correlating
80
. Consequently, one can assume that 
the dissimilarity of the agreements when it comes to government influence is of less im-
portance for the interpretation of them.  
 
This contention is further backed by the fact that both the AAPL JOA and the Norwegian 
operating agreement are model-forms. Parties to model-forms will occasionally be unaware 
of the scope of the agreements and the obligations that lie therein
81
. Thus, allowing model-
form provisions to be interpreted subjectively can negate the whole intention of model-
forms, which is to have a predictable set of regulations for parties engaging in a type of 
project. 
Furthermore, developing a uniform operating agreement with substantial predictability for 
awardees of production licenses on the N.C.S. was one of the main objectives of the Nor-
wegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy when they standardized the Norwegian operating 
agreement in 2007
82
. This aim of having a uniform agreement with persistent terms would 
not be achieved if parties were allowed subjective interpretations of the JOA. 
In sum, there is ample support for interpreting the contracts objectively in harmony with 
principles of contract interpretation. 
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2.5.2 The purpose of the operating agreement 
2.5.2.1 Risk allocation and capital dispersal 
 
Exploring for- and producing oil and gas is considered a highly risky business, which re-
quires a lot of venture capital and can give rise to astronomical claims
83
. Even more so in 
present time, when the majority of conventional easily accessible high-output onshore res-
ervoirs are developed and most new exploration is done offshore or in artic environments 
where the initial capital investment and risk is higher. Expensive technology, such as that 
necessary for horizontal drilling and fracing operations in shale formations hav further ne-
cessitated higher initial investments
84
 and has led to pooling of skills and technology. Not 
to mention the increasing exploration activities in emerging countries where the political 
risk is considerable
85
. Consequently, one of the most important reasons for entering into a 
joint venture is investment risk allocation. When parties to a JOA jointly explore and drill a 
wildcat, the damage to each party in case the well proves to be a dry hole is reduced signif-
icantly compared to the situation where one company alone has all the risk. If oil and gas 
companies share the cost of exploring and drilling in new areas, each company can disperse 
capital over several projects and reduce the general risk of doing business.  
 
2.5.2.2 Transaction cost 
 
The reduction in transaction costs for participants in U.S. oil and gas business due to the 
dominance of model-form JOAs is also apparent. With model-forms reflecting industry 
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customs and practice with certainty of meaning and apparent fairness, parties negotiating a 
JOA can spend their time settling aberrant terms.  
The argument applies partly in Norway as well. When parties are not allowed to negotiate 
the terms of their own JOA
86
, the related transaction cost will be lower because there are no 
terms to settle. 
 
2.5.2.3 Financing 
 
An additional advantage of the JOA is that it is easier to obtain financing. The JOA offers 
noticeable guarantee and predictability for investors and lenders, who can use this well-
known agreement as evidence of actual share of the contract area along with other docu-
mentation. Examining the JOA allows investors and lenders to predict how the participant 
will receive production and pay costs, thus better enabling them to make an informed deci-
sion of whether or not to invest or fund part of the project.  
 
2.5.2.4 Disadvantages of the JOA 
 
An apparent downside to entering into a JOA is the loss of control with operations for non-
operators. However, it is commonly recognized that the mentioned benefits of a JOA coun-
teract some loss of control. It is worth mentioning that participation in the management 
committee
87
 (See 2.6 about the management committee) under the Norwegian agreement 
offers non-operators ample control with operations, thus countering the loss-of-control ar-
gument.  
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2.5.3 General about the operator under each agreement 
 
One of the parties will be appointed to function as the operator with authority to carry out 
operations such as preparing work-programs and development plans, provide staffing and 
hiring contractors, conduct operations, account for funds, provide information to non-
operators, management committee and partner forum (Norwegian operating agreement) 
and host government. Furthermore, the operator shall represent non-operators in relation to 
the host government and third-parties, procure insurance and manage health, security and 
safety regulations.  
In short, the operator will function as manager of the contract area, carrying out operations 
and make certain operational decisions
88
.  
 
Likewise, the operator is responsible for hiring contractors. That means that the operators 
shall contract with third parties such as service contractors providing heli-lift, catering, 
drilling, and even insurance.   
The Norwegian operating agreement article 3.2 specifies that operator acts on behalf of the 
non-operators when dealing with contractors. The consequence of the operator acting on 
behalf of the non-operators is a chance for the third-party, the service-provider, to claim 
performance from the other non-operators in the event the operator does not comply with 
his obligations. Thus, the service-provider can make a direct claim to the non-operators. 
That represents a fundamental difference from the AAPL JOA. Article 5.1 specifies that the 
operator is an independent contractor when performing services under the agreement, thus 
not acting on behalf of the non-operators. If the operator does not comply with his contrac-
tual obligation to a third party, the third party cannot claim compensation
89
 from the non-
operators. 
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 22 
The operator is compensated on a no gain-no loss basis. This way of compensating the op-
erator is fundamental to JOAs. The no gain-no loss principle means that the operator’s shall 
be paid on a cost recovery basis with an overhead specified in the accounting provision. 
Thus, the operator shall not profit from his function as operator in the contract area. Costs 
incurred by the operator on behalf of the non-operators and petroleum produced shall be 
distributed according to the share of the contract area and not be a source of profit or loss 
for the operator. The operator’s economic interest shall be based on his share of the con-
tract area, not services rendered as operator
90
. The no gain-no loss principle is similar in 
both the Norwegian operating agreement
91
, the AAPL JOA and most other JOAs
92
.   
 
2.5.4 Specific about the Operator on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
 
The Norwegian Petroleum Act article 1-69(k) defines the operators as the one who is “exe-
cuting on behalf of the licensee the day to day management of the petroleum activities”. 
The language of the Norwegian operating agreement elaborates the act, stating that “The 
operator shall carry out and administer the day to day management of the joint venture 
activities”93, making the operator in charge of the day-to-day operations in the concession 
area. Typical responsibilities of an operator on the N.C.S. are drilling, preparing cash-
calls
94
, supplying mandatory data and documentation to the Ministry of Petroleum and En-
ergy, the partner-forum
95
 and the management committee
96. The operator’s authority is not 
unlimited, however. The Norwegian operating agreements most profound limit on the op-
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erator’s will is the management committee’s decision-making authority with binding effect 
upon the operator
97
.  
 
2.5.4.1 The management committee 
  
Each company having a share of the concession area (One or more blocks) on the N.C.S. in 
the form of a production license is eligible to participate in the management committee 
which consists of one member and one deputy member from each company
98
. 
Participation in the management committee allows non-operators to take an active role in 
the decision-making process. According to the Norwegian operating agreement article 1.3, 
the management committee is the venture’s upper body of decision-making and decides in 
most matters of importance. The mandatory management committee might represent the 
most fundamental difference between Norwegian upstream development and US-based 
upstream development.  
 
2.5.4.2 More specific about the operator in the U.S.A. 
 
The AAPL JOA has no provision for a management committee. The AAPL JOA article 5.1 
states that “the Operator has the exclusive right and duty to conduct (or cause to be con-
ducted) all activities or operations under this Agreement.  In performing services under 
this Agreement for the Non-Operating Parties, the Operator is an independent contractor, 
not subject to the control or direction of Non-Operating Parties” 
It is apparent from the language of article 5.1 in the AAPL JOA that the operator is the ven-
ture’s upper body of decision-making. The operator is given a profound ability to decide 
and control how the operations should be carried out, not limited by a management com-
mittee or similar control sharing mechanisms. Compared to the Norwegian operating 
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agreement, the AAPL JOA vests a vast freedom of choice upon the operator not found in 
the Norwegian operating agreement. 
However, the AAPL agreement contains some restrictions on the operator’s discretion in 
decision that have a great impact on the venture’s activities. There is a requirement for non-
operator consent in decisions such as revision of well-plan
99
, cease of drilling
100
, Long 
Lead development system AFE
101
, withdrawal
102
, deepening, plugging and abandoning a 
well.  
 
In sum, the operator is given ample freedom of choice under the AAPL JOA not found in 
the Norwegian operating agreement. But the freedom is not unlimited, as the AAPL JOA 
specifically sets forth  
operations that require consent of the non-operators, which for those situations is compara-
ble to the structure in the Norwegian operating agreeement. 
It is noticeable that the operator’s freedom of choice is positively defined103  in the AAPL 
JOA, whereas the freedom of choice seems to be negatively defined
104
 in the Norwegian 
operating agreement. 
 
The operator’s freedom of choice is further restrained because of his duties of care towards 
the non-operators. I aim to compare that duty in the following section. 
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3 OPERATOR CONDUCT 
3.1 Conduct 
 
In this section I will elaborate rules elaborate duties of care under the Norwegian operating 
agreement and the AAPL JOA, and compare them as I go. However, the sources of appli-
cable law are not the same
105
. For that reason, there will be several occasions where I don’t 
compare agreement to agreement, statutory law to statutory law, as ordinary methods of 
law would prescribe.  
I aim to examine the conduct in an order starting with the source of law prescribing the 
lowest duty of conduct, before I move towards the source of law prescribing the highest 
applicable duty of conduct.  
I will first compare duties of good faith, then duties of cooperation, before I compare the 
highest applicable duty of care derived from article 5.2.1 in the AAPL JOA and the doc-
trine of loyalty in contracts. 
 
I will focus on the duty of care towards the non-operators, such as having regard for their 
interest. I will not examine the general skill, caution, expertise and prudence an operator 
must show when conduction production operations.  
The manner in which production operations must be performed is set forth in the petroleum 
act section 4-1 about prudent production. Section 4-1 requires production to take place in 
accordance with prudent technical and sound economic principles and in such a manner 
that waste of petroleum or reservoir energy is avoided. That will require a determination of 
whether the operator has performed in a prudent technical and sound economic manner 
which must be founded on an objective evaluation of facts which commonly will require 
technical expertise, hence not a distinct legal determination. 
That is comparable to the requirement in the AAPL JOA. Article 5.2.1. specifies that op-
                                                 
 
105
 Partly due to differences in civil law and common law tradition. Default law is of more importance in civil 
law. The reliance on default law partly explains the shorter Norwegian operating agreement compared to 
the AAPL JOA . 
 26 
erations must be performed as a reasonable prudent operator in a good workman-like 
manner. To determine whether the operator has acted with such prudence, one must do an 
objective evaluation of the facts and decide whether the acts were comparable to what a 
prudent experienced operator would do
106
. Hence, not a distinct legal question, but a de-
termination requiring technical expertise.  
 
My area of focus is therefore the operator’s duty to safeguard the interest of the non-
operators as that is commonly a question of law. 
 
3.1.1 Conduct set forth in the agreements 
 
The logical starting point in questions of contractual matters is to examine the contents of 
the applicable agreements. 
  
3.1.2 The operator’s responsibilities under the Norwegian operating agreement  
 
The Norwegian operating agreement does not say much about the duty of the operator to 
safeguard the non-operators interest. The Norwegian operating agreement article 3.1 (1) 
only states that the operator shall carry out and administer the day to day management of 
the joint venture activities without giving any more directives to what level of conduct or 
duty of care to be expected.  
 
3.2 The conduct required in statutory law  
 
Statutory default law is the relevant area of focus in Norway, in the event the agreement 
itself does not specify the standard of care, and no other evidence is at hand. 
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For the sake of comparison, that would not be the result in U.S. common law where reli-
ance on statutory default law is less common in contractual relations. One would rather rely 
on the contracts themselves and previous rulings in cases with same factual basis. 
 
The petroleum act is the foremost act setting forth mandatory rules for petroleum activities 
and those involved on the N.C.S.. 
However, neither the petroleum act section 3-7 about the operator nor section 1-6(k) about 
definitions sets forth anything related to the duty of care towards non-operators. Neither is 
anything of guidance specified in the regulations
107
.  
 
The remaining statutory provisions are acts setting forth the conduct to expect for the legal 
enterprises covered by them
108
. However, applying those acts requires a determination of 
what kind of relationship the operating agreement establishes. If the relationship under the 
operating agreement falls within any of the categories, the statutory provisions for that cat-
egory apply.   
 
3.2.1 The character of the venture as determination of the level of care 
3.2.1.1 The character of the venture in Norway  
 
The partnership act
109
 section 1-1 (4)
110
 exempt agreements for joint petroleum activities. 
Interpreted strictly, the act will seemingly not offer guidance to the any questions that 
might arise connected to JOAs because they are exempted. However, the preliminary 
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work
111
 partly speaks to not apply a strict interpretation of the exemption is section 1-1(4). 
It reads that the exemption specified in section 1-1(4) of the partnership act of course will 
not repudiate the act as default law for queries not explicitly specified in the operating 
agreement
112
. (My translation). Thus, the statement in the preliminary work indicates that 
the partnership act can be applied as default law in certain legal enquiries.  
 
Furthermore, the preliminary work
113
 states that by giving the partnership act, objective 
default law for the [selskapsforhold] venture the operating agreement creates be estab-
lished and can clarify matters not stipulated in the operating agreement. That is generally 
considered a benefit
114
. (My translation). The consequence of the statement is that statutory 
law in the partnership act specifying the duty of care by a person responsible for carrying 
out and administering
115
 venture businesses will possibly apply.  
 
One potential source of law is section 2-18(1) in the partnership act regarding the manager. 
The statute reads that the manager is the one who ...carry out the day-to-day administration 
of the company
116
. (My translation) 
Construing the language objectively, it is a viable contention that the operator is such a 
manager. That would subject the operator of the implied duties of a manager, because the 
operator is the one who carries out the day-to-day administration. 
Another factor that speaks to such an analogy is the fact that the operator on the N.C.S. is 
subject to the supervision and decisions by the management committee, and is responsible 
for carrying out their decisions. That is quite similar to the manager in a partnership who is 
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supervised by the partners.   
The same goes for the fact that the operator can bind the non-operators to third parties, just 
like a manager.  
In sum, the operator performs a function quite similar to the manager of a company subject 
to section 2-18 (1) in the partnership act.   
 
On the other hand, such an analogy would entail far-reaching duties of care and a represen-
tation which is hard to combine with the fact that the operator is not paid, only performing 
on a no loss-no gain basis.  
 
I find that incorporating the vast duties of care of a manager as set forth in the partnership 
act section 2-18 (1) into the operating agreement would be contrary to the partnership act 
section 1-1(4) expressly exempting operating agreements. The preliminary work
117
 shows 
that the legislature purposely and knowingly exempted the venture under the operating 
agreement from the partnership act, though they kept the door open for certain analogies. 
Nevertheless, it cannot have been the intention of the legislature to allow the operating 
agreement to directly fall within any of the categories of the partnership act. Consequently, 
the relationship under the operating agreement cannot be deemed anything other than con-
tractual relationship where the where the duty of care is determined by laws and principles 
of contract.  
I will come back to that after elaborating the U.S. approach to whether or not the AAPL 
JOA fits in a category of established enterprises. 
 
3.2.1.2 The character of the venture in the U.S.A. 
 
The lack of an exemption like to one in the Norwegian partnership act section 1-1(4) has 
caused some litigation in U.S. oil-producing states. Part of the cause for that litigation is 
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that no law is stating that parties entering into JOAs are not forming a legal entity that falls 
within an established corporate definition
118
. The issue that most often arises is whether or 
not the JOA creates an ordinary joint venture
119
, partnership, agency, trust or similar with 
established duties and rights.  
Non-operators have been especially eager to have the relationship under the JOA deemed a 
joint venture, partnership, trust or similar because that entails vast responsibilities for the 
operator not found in mere contractual relationships. One of the main duties in such entities 
are fiduciary-duties which in short obligates the fiduciary to work in the best interest
120
 of 
his principal, thus implying a high standard of conduct, similar to the duties among part-
ners in a Norwegian partnership
121
 or parties to a contractual which requires a very high 
degree of loyalty, such as a  Rt 1967 s.1335.  
 
However, most U.S. courts have found that the JOA is a contractual relationship, not a 
partnership, joint venture, agency, trust or similar. The reasoning behind most of the judg-
ments is that some fundamental conditions for such entities are not met
122
. The condition 
most prone to litigation is the mutual control
123
 or mutual cooperation
124
 criterion, which 
requires the non-operators to take an active role in the operations for it to be deemed an 
ordinary joint venture, partnership, trust and similar. It comes without saying that the mu-
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tual control
125
 or mutual cooperation
126
 condition is hard to establish when the operator 
under the AAPL JOA is declared the venture’s upper body of decision-making and carries 
out the day to day activities without non-operator interference.  
Though, some courts have found the JOA to create an ordinary joint venture, partnership, 
agency, trust and similar. However, those were cases with some uncommon factual fea-
tures. Among them that: 
 
1. There were pre-contractual circumstances creating a relationship of trust and con-
fidence
127
 
 
2. The JOA had a special provision that let the non-operators take an active role in 
the operations
128
 
 
3. The non-operators have taken a more active role in operations than the JOA spec-
ifies
129
 
 
4. When the operator was marketing or dealing with kind
130
 for non-operator(s)
131
 
 
U.S. courts have thus held that absent such special circumstances, the operating agreement 
is merely a relationship governed by the contract itself and law of contracts. 
 
For the sake of comparison: that would most likely not have been the case if the op-
erator in the U.S.A. could contract on behalf
132
 of the non-operators, as he can in 
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Norway. Under U.S. Law of Agency, he would be deemed an agent of the non-
operators falling into a category with associated fiduciary duties which entail 
among other things that the exculpatory clause is unenforceable.   
 
The conclusion is that the characterization of the relationship established by the operating 
agreement is the same in both the U.S. and Norway. The duty of care will be determined by 
law of contracts in both jurisdictions.  
 
3.3 The duty of care derived from law of contracts  
 
I will start with the lowest duty of care which is the duty to act in good faith throughout the 
duration of the contract, before examining and comparing the duty of care derived from the 
doctrine of loyalty in contracts which is the principal source of law for the question at 
hand. 
3.3.1 The duty of good faith in Norway 
 
The code on contract § 33 sets forth that parties engaging in contractual obligations has a 
general duty to act in good faith that applies pre-contractually, at time of closing and for the 
duration of the contract
133
.  Pre-contractual obligations and duties of care at closing is 
largely irrelevant because entering into the operating agreement is term for obtaining the 
production license. The duty of good faith will consequently be of significance after the 
parties have entered into the operating agreement. 
The duty to act in good faith set forth in section 33 implies a rather low standard of conduct 
which in short terms requires the receiving party to disclose any knowledge of circum-
stances that speaks to not let the agreement or subsequent promises be binding. An example 
of such a situation is the case when the recipient knows of circumstances crucial for the 
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performance of the contract, that the presenter of the obligation doesn’t know, and, the 
recipient knows that the presenter isn’t able to act in its own best interest because of the 
missing information. Applied to the operator in a JOA, he would be forced to disclose 
knowledge of any circumstance that he knows is crucial for the performance of the ven-
tures activities to the management committee. Typically, an operator would have a duty to 
disclose that a contractor has proved incapable of performing satisfactory according to 
common standards of the oil and gas industry when informing the management committee. 
I will next determine whether the same duty of good faith apply to the operator under the 
AAPL JOA. 
3.3.2 The duty of good faith under the AAPL operating agreement 
 
In M&T, Inc.v. Fuel Resources Development Co.
134
, the court found that the operator was 
obligated to use due care and show good faith when estimating costs in the AFE
135
.  
Acknowledged legal scholars interpret the judgment so that that the good faith requirement 
applies in other operations as well
136
. Thus, there is support for suggesting that a good faith 
obligation exists under the AAPL JOA.  
Another case regarding the preparation of an AFE
137
 can be explanatory for the substance 
of the good faith obligation. 
In Varn v. Maloney
138
 the court found the operator in breach of the duty of good faith and 
due care when negligently preparing an instrument which he knows the other participants 
will rely on in making the decision to authorize drilling.  
From the statement, the court lets the duty of good faith apply to the receiver of the con-
tractual obligation and provides a remedy for neglecting to properly inform co-contractors 
of matters of importance to them [In the case, signing the AFE]. The court requires the pre-
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senter of the promise to disclose information he know is of importance to the receiver 
which comparable to the requirements under the good faith obligation in Norway. 
Another parallel is the degree of fault of fault necessary for the party in breach.  
In Varn v. Maloney
139
 and Argos Resources, Inc. v. May Petroleum, Inc.
140
 the court finds 
breach of the duty of good faith, even though the party in breach was merely acting negli-
gently. It is written in the preparatory work
141
 to section 33 in the code of contracts that one 
must emphasize whether a party showed negligence. Thus, in both jurisdictions, the good 
faith obligation does not require the party in breach to act willfully. Ordinary Negligence is 
sufficient to be in breach.  
 
Conclusively, there is a good faith requirement under both the AAPL JOA and the norwe-
gian operating agreement with equal substance, equal structure and equal application.  
 
The question that naturally arises is whether or not a higher duty of care can be derived 
from the doctrine of loyalty in contracts
142
.  
 
3.4 The duty of care derived from the doctrine of loyalty in contracts  
  
The doctrine of loyalty in contracts is a non-statutory dynamic legal standard derived from 
the duty of good faith set forth in section 33 in the code on contracts
143
. It is perceived to be 
an implied covenant in contractual relationships and has effect in the pre-contractual, at 
time of closing and for the duration of the contract
144
 . The covenant is perceived to be set 
forth a wider array of duties than the duty of good faith. The general content of covenant is 
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a mutual obligation to diligently protect the interest of the co-contractor(s) showing due 
care and loyalty at all stages of the contractual relationship
145
. Some of the obligations 
that have been articulated by courts based the doctrine are: 
 
(1) An obligation to work for the realization of the common objective of the con-
tract
146
,
147
  
 
(2) A duty to keep the co-contractor(s) informed about matters that may affect the 
objective of the contract, typically when unexpected circumstances or new condi-
tions alternates the basis for the contractual obligation
148
. Typically circumstances 
that the other party has a reasonable expectation to be informed about. 
 
(3) A duty to diligently limit losses if breach of contract/default
149
 
 
The extent of these obligations varies under the doctrine depending on factors such as the 
type
150
 of contract and length
151
 of contract. 
When considering the amount of type of contract, herein the capital involved, and the aver-
age length of a JOA
152
, it is quite apparent that the doctrine applies to its full extent.  
 
The first question that arises is whether or not a similar doctrine applies to the AAPL JOA 
for operations in the U.S.A. 
 
A partially comparable principle to the doctrine of loyalty in contracts is the contractual 
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principle of cooperation
153
. The principle of cooperation requires operator and non-
operators to cooperate to carry out the objective of the contract
154
, which is comparable to 
the obligation to work for the realization of the common object of the contract
155
 derived 
from the doctrine of loyalty in contracts.  
The principle has been applied in a case brought in for the United States Supreme Court 
regarding an oil and gas lease. In Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation
156
, the 
Supreme Court of the United States said that a covenant on respondent’s part to continue 
the work of exploration, development and production is to be implied from the relation of 
the parties and the object of the lease. 
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stressed the relationship and the object
157
 of the instrument 
in question, comparable to the Norwegian Supreme Court emphasizing the object of the 
contract in Rt. 1967 s.1335. 
 
The question that remains is whether there is a source of law that specifies an even higher 
standard of conduct under the AAPL agreement. 
I have not found any applicable sources setting forth a higher standard than the doctrine of 
loyalty in contracts.  
For the AAPL JOA, the answer to the question is presumably yes. Article 5.2.1 of the 
agreement sets forth a standard of conduct that not only obligates the operator to act in 
good faith
158
 and work toward the realization of the common objective
159
, but imposes ad-
ditional duties upon the operator. 
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Therefore, I will first scrutinize article 5.2.1 of the AAPL JOA, before I compare it to doc-
trine of loyalty in contracts and analyze the findings. 
 
3.5 The conduct specified in article 5.2.1 of the AAPL JOA 
 
The AAPL JOA article 5.2.1 specifies that The Operator shall timely commence and con-
duct all activities or operations in a good and workmanlike manner, as would a prudent 
operator under the same or similar circumstances. The language has been interpreted to set 
forth an obligation to act as a reasonable prudent operator
160
, which is the same standard 
of conduct that has been applied between lessees and lessors as an implied covenant
161
 to 
property leases. A question that I will make an attempt to answer is whether the doctrine of 
loyalty in contracts imposes the same duties as the reasonable prudent operator standard. 
However, I find it necessary to elaborate the content of the standard first.   
 
The reasonable prudent operator standard is not defined anywhere in the JOA. For that 
reason, interpretations by courts and acknowledged legal scholars are by and large the only 
sources of guidance on how to construe it. 
 
The reasonable prudent operator standard can be separated in two: 
 
(a) It specifies how the operator shall produce from the well. Typically, avoid drainage and 
other waste
162
. Avoiding Waste means that the operator is obligated to negate excessive 
loss of reservoir energy and other economic waste by means of offset wells, enhanced re-
covery methods and so forth. 
Thus, that part of the obligation is comparable to section 4-1 of the petroleum act obliging 
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the operator to apply prudent technical and sound economic principles in such a manner 
that waste of petroleum or reservoir energy is avoided. 
 
(b) It specifies to what degree the operator shall make sure that the non-operators’ interest 
are observed. 
 
The mentioned obligations in (a) and (b) are interrelated. If the operator is not performing 
well operations prudently, the consequence is harm to the non-operators interest. Courts 
tend to mingle the duties by handing down broadly termed opinions that comprise every 
operation carried out by the operator. I will as already mentioned, focus on how the opera-
tor must care for the interests (b) of the non-operators. 
 
The Supreme Court of Kansas elaborated the defined the reasonable prudent operator 
standard in Smith v. Amoco Production Co.,
163
 where the court evaluated Amoco’s (Opera-
tor and lessee) marketing decisions in light of the changing environmental regulatory envi-
ronment to determine whether Amoco had acted as a reasonable prudent operator. In re-
manding the case to the district court, the following guidelines where provided to evaluate 
whether Amoco had exercised its judgment as a reasonable prudent operator in a good 
workman-like manner: (1) The operator’s conduct will be evaluated by considering “What 
an experienced operator of ordinary prudence would do under the same or similar circum-
stances, having due regard of the interest of both…[Lessor and lessee]”  (2) Evaluation of 
the prudent operator standard is a question of fact.  
 
It can be read from the opinion provided by the Kansas Supreme Court that the first part 
establishes and objective standard of conduct dependent on what an experienced operator 
with ordinary prudence would do.  
It is quite clear that this standard of conduct does not give obligations that come close to 
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those of a fiduciary. A fiduciary is, in short, obligated to work in the best interest
164
 of his 
principal, not only have due regard of the interest of his principal. Thus, a deriving a lower 
standard is the correct approach.  
 
Acknowledged legal scholars claim that due regard for the interest of both parties mean 
that the operator is: 
 
(1) Subject to a duty of keeping non-operators informed of matters that the operator, 
when exercising his best judgment, considers important
165
. 
 
(2) Free to act on an arm’s length basis in accordance with their own respective 
self-interest
166
. Acting on an arm’s length basis means that the parties act inde-
pendently in contracts and have prior no relationship to each other that can alter the 
terms of the transaction
167
. 
 
A case from the Supreme Court of Norway, Rt. 1967 s.1335 Sildolje, regarding duty of care 
and loyalty owed by producers of Herring-oil speaks can serve a basis for comparison of 
the duties. 
Besides producing oil, the contractual relationship between the producers was quite similar 
to that of an operating agreement. 
The facts of the case were the following: Herring-oil producers united to share quotas in a 
profit-maximizing way. The producers jointly established an office with the sole purpose of 
working to the benefit of the producers and dividing quotas equally. However, some of the 
producers got bigger quotas without the office’s blessing, thus achieving an advantage not 
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shared with the others. The other producers brought action claiming that the producers with 
the bigger quotas were in breach of their contract by not working for the common objective 
of the contract.  
The contract didn’t say anything about acquiring quotas “on the side”. 
 
The Supreme Court found the producers who gained bigger quotas were in breach of their 
contract.  
The court held that one must assume that agreements for cooperative purposes are observed 
loyally. It further stated that there is no need for a clause saying that parties cannot engage 
in parallel businesses in the same industry, because such activity would counteract the 
common objective of the contract. Further, the court held that the doctrine of loyalty in con-
tracts has two fundamental implications: (1) The parties must refrain from certain acts, and 
(2) The parties must act to ensure that the duty of loyalty is observed. 
 
It can seem like the Supreme Court impose a high level of conduct on parties to contracts 
for cooperative purposeswhen it is stating that it’s an implied covenant to such agreements 
that the parties cannot engage in competing businesses.  
It can be derived from the reasoning of the court that the level of conduct under the doc-
trine of loyalty in contracts will be determined based on the collaborative nature of the rela-
tionship in the contract.  
Applied to the operating agreement supports a finding that the operating agreement re-
quires a somewhat high level of care. 
 
However, applying the holding from sildolje to operating agreements in the oil and gas 
industry has some implications: 
 
For one thing, nobody would enter into a cooperative operating agreement like the JOA if 
that negated competitive activity on other tracts. Companies in the oil and gas industry or-
dinarily spread their capital and interest over several ventures, not like most of the herring-
oil producers who had their capital vested in only one at the time sildolje was litigated 
 41 
 
The second issues that speaks to not let the holding have any effect on JOAs is that it is 
doubtful whether the factual basis of the agreement in siljolje and the operating agreement 
is close enough. The operating agreement in sildolje was intended to create a monopoly-
like environment for producers of Herring-oil. An agreement to create a monopoly is not 
worth much if any of the parties engage in competing businesses at different terms. Thus, 
resisting from competitive transaction must be deemed the foremost duty in such an agree-
ment. It would alter the entire basis for the cooperation.  
 
On the other hand, disregarding the monopoly-like aspect of the agreement in Sild-olje, the 
agreement is entered into to create a cooperative environment for the common goal, create 
best possible terms for the parties to it. That is closely related to the operating agreement to 
which parties enter to produce as much oil and gas possible for the lowest possible cost.  
Thus, the agreement’s two main purposes are 
(1) Generating as much profit possible for the parties 
(2) Creating a cooperative environment for the benefit of the parties  
 
These are purposes that the operating agreement and the cooperative agreement in sild-olje 
have in common.  
 
When observing that the Supreme Court of Norway allows a variable duty
168
 of care and 
loyalty in contracts based on criteria such as the length
169
 and type 
170
of contract, it is quite 
evident that the operating agreement with its cooperative features is a type of agreement 
that requires a high level of care and loyalty. An example underpinning that is the reality 
that non-operators are letting one of their competitors act on their behalf and carry out the 
day-to-day operations for them.  
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The variable duty also allows one to disregard the fact that the parties’ intention in sildolje 
was to create a monopoly-like environment, and consequently, disregard the courts finding 
that relates to the monopoly aspect of the agreement. The consequence of not disregarding 
these factors would be a finding that parties to cooperative agreements were not allowed to 
engage arm’s length transactions.   
 
My conclusion is that duties of care set forth in sildolje will partly apply to the Norwegian 
operating agreement because of the cooperative element which requires a particularly high 
level of care. In sum, that would oblige the operator to have due care for the non-operators, 
but still have the ability to engage in arm’s length transactions.  
The standard of care would consequently correspond to the duty of care of the reasonable 
prudent operator standard.  
 
Whether or not a variable duty of conduct applies under the AAPL JOA has been subject to 
litigation in the U.S.A. 
3.5.1 The reasonable prudent operator standard – A variable standard 
 
Legal scholars claim that one aspect of the reasonable prudent operator standard is that it 
is not a constant standard of conduct, but depending upon the type of activity involved
171
.  
The following case is an example of that. In Holloway v. Atlantic Richfield
172
 the question 
was, among other issues, whether defendant, the operator, Atlantic Richfield (Later Arco) 
owed a higher (fiduciary) duty when marketing plaintiff’s, Halloway’s, natural gas. The 
Texas court of appeals found that such a duty existed when the operator was handling mon-
ey for the non-operator.  
The court reasoned that …a duty did arise when Arco marketed Holloway's gas. But it was 
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a limited duty to account for the monies received for selling his gas, to avoid conflicts of 
interests, and not to act as an adverse party in its capacity as the seller of his gas… 
It is quite clear that the court imposes a different duty upon the operator when handling 
money on behalf of another party to the JOA. The court apparently acknowledges that a 
variable duty of conduct can occur between parties to a JOA, depending on the type of op-
erations undertaken. That partly correlates to the courts conclusions in Rt. 1936 s. 909 
which implies that the extent of obligations under the doctrine of loyalty in contracts varies 
depending on factors such as the type of contract
173
 and length of contract
174
. 
The Texas court seemingly imposes duties of an agent upon the operator and provides Hal-
loway with rights as it was the principal, when the operator is handling of money on Hal-
loway’s behalf. Whether or not the court emphasizes what parties that are benefiting from 
the operation when determining if a higher level of conduct applies, is not clear. Reasoning 
from the courts explanation, especially the part saying that Halloway (operator) had a high-
er level of conduct that was a limited duty to account for the monies received for selling his 
(Atlantic Richfield) gas the court seems to accentuate that Atlantic Richfield was the only 
one having an interest in the monies for only one person. It is therefore a viable contention 
that a variable duty arise under the reasonable prudent operator standard, just as under the 
doctrine of loyalty.  
 
For that reason, one may ask whether or not a Norwegian court applying the doctrine of 
loyalty in contracts would have found that an operator who is marketing gas on behalf of a 
non-operator is bound to a higher or lower duty of care than he is bound to under the JOA.  
For one thing, the JOAs govern upstream oil and gas production, not downstream gas mar-
keting. (Unless the operating agreement has provisions for gas-balancing). A court could 
reason that the gas marketing obligation was another type
175
 of contract, not an operating 
agreement, thus requiring a different level of care. Furthermore, a court could reason that 
the marketing agreement requires a higher standard of conduct because only the under-
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produced non-operator would benefit from the marketing, by that creating a relationship of 
trust and confidence
176
.  
The answer is not apparent, but the variable duty under the doctrine of loyalty in contracts  
allows a flexibility like the U.S. courts seems to employ to the operating agreements. 
 
3.6 Conclusion: 
Both the reasonable prudent operator standard and the doctrine of loyalty in contracts 
impose a variable standard of care dependent upon the type of operations undertaken and 
type of agreement.   
They both impose an obligation to work for the realization of the common objective of the 
contract
177
,
178
, keep non-operators informed about matters that may affect the objective of 
the contract, and both gives an opportunity to engage in arm’s length transactions for own 
benefit.  
 
However, a distinction is that the duty of care under the reasonable prudent operator 
standard has a more established content. An example is the definite duty to have due re-
gard of the non-operators interest which is derived from the reasonable prudent operator 
standard. It is established that the operator is free to act on an arm’s length basis in ac-
cordance with his own respective self-interest while having due regard for the non-
operators. The doctrine of loyalty in contracts does not support that level of predictability 
for the operator.  
The level of conduct required of the operator under the doctrine of loyalty in contracts will 
be determined based on factors such as the collaborative nature of the relationship under 
the operating agreement, and reasonable expectations of the parties. 
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